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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF TRIBAL COURTS
OVER NONMEMBER INDIANS: THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since at least the 19th century the plight of the American Indian has
occupied a place in the consciousness and conscience of many Ameri-
cans. Students of American history know of the injustices that often
have been done to Indians. As a result of increased concern in the past
twenty years over Indian rights, the federal government has adopted pol-
icies designed to enhance the tribes' independence and self-governance. 1
To exercise fully the powers of an independent government, a sover-
eign government must be able to enforce its laws and resolve disputes
through the exercise of judicial power. The extent to which Indian tribes
have jurisdiction over disputes affecting their interests and the enforce-
ment of their laws is an important measure of their sovereignty, as it is
with state and federal governments.
An important and yet unresolved question directly related to the
sovereignty of Indian tribes is whether the tribes have criminal jurisdic-
tion over Indians who are not members of the- tribe, but who commit
crimes on the tribes' reservations. To answer this jurisdictional question
requires an understanding of many significant factors and principles con-
trolling Indian tribe jurisdiction, including the special status the tribes
have under federal and state law.
The Indian tribes have a unique relationship with the United States
government. 2 Once a people who possessed full sovereignty over their
lands,3 the European conquest drastically altered the Indians' status to
1. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). Justice Marshall speaking for
the Court stated that "[the condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike
that of any other two people in existence... T]he relation of the Indians to the United States is
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else."
3. Having complete sovereignty over their territories implies that the tribes possessed "all the
powers of any sovereign state." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1942)
(quoting statement by the Department of the Interior explaining retained sovereign powers of the
Indian tribes).
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one of semi-independence.4 As a result of this transformation, Indian
tribes became dependent on the United States "to restrain the disorderly
and licentious from intrusions into their country.... ."S Despite the fact
that Indian tribes are under extensive federal control, they have remained
"a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations .... -"6 According to federal law, the tribes retain all aspects of
sovereignty that have not been terminated by Congress and are not "in-
consistent with their status" as a dependent nation.7 Thus, a tribe has
the power to determine tribal membership, 8 to regulate domestic rela-
tions among its members, 9 and to prescribe rules for the inheritance of
property. 10 In addition, an Indian tribe undisputably has the authority
to enforce its criminal laws against its own members."
Determing who is a member of a tribe, and dealing with members
and nonmembers of tribes, has become more complicated as of late.
Through intermarriage and government programs that increase contact
between tribes, Indians often reside on reservations or have significant
contacts with tribes to which they do not belong. 12 As a result of their
4. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
5. Worehester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552 (1832).
6. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 16 (Cherokees recognized by the United States "as a distinct political society, separated from
others, capable of managing [their] own affairs and governing [themselves] .. "); Act of Aug. 7,
1789, ch. 8, art. 3, 1 Stat. 50, 52 ("The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the
Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights, and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed .... ").
The Department of the Interior has described the retained powers of the Indian tribes as
follows:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2)
Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in
substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe,.. . but does not by
itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe .... (3) These [internal] powers are subject
to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus ex-
pressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in
their duly constituted organs of government.
Quoted in F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 123.
7. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
8. See, eg., Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 95 (1906); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S.
218, 222 (1897).
9. See, eg., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (adoption of Indian child by
Indians within jurisdiction of tribal court to the exclusion of state courts); United States v. Quiver,
241 U.S. 602, 604 (1915).
10. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 29 (1899); United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 100, 102 (1855).
11. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
12. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
TRIBAL COURTS
contacts with the reservations, these nonmember Indians 13 have an
impact upon the sovereignty and interests of the tribal government. This
impact manifests itself in the resolution of the complicated and impor-
tant question whether a tribal court possesses criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians who have significant ties to a reservation.
Criminal jurisdiction rules for crimes committed on Indian reserva-
tions form a confusing maze of federal, state, and tribal court authority.
Which court can assert jurisdiction depends upon what type of crime was
allegedly committed, and whether non-Indians and Indians were in-
volved. 14 Unfortunately, the relevant treaties, federal statutes, and
Supreme Court decisions do not explicitly define where nonmember Indi-
ans fit into this jurisdictional scheme. If they are treated as non-Indians,
the proper forum will be either a state or federal court.15 Only if these
nonmember Indians are considered tribal members may a tribal court
maintain criminal jurisdiction over them.16
Two circuits have addressed the question of criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians who allegedly committed crimes on the reser-
vation. In Duro v. Reina, 17 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians who have significant contacts to the reservation and
13. A "nonmember Indian" is an individual of Indian blood who is not officially enrolled in the
tribe at issue. See, eg., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 160 (1980) ("nonmem-
bers" include those Indians "resident on the reservation but not enrolled in the governing Tribe");
Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1988) (enrolled member of Torrez-Martinez band of
Mission Indians is a nonmember of the Salt River Indian Reservation); Greywater v. Joshua, 846
F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1988) (enrolled members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
are nonmembers of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe).
14. See infra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 27, 70 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. Also, a tribal court has civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians in certain instances. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (Blackfeet
Tribal Court had jurisdiction over conduct of non-Indian in personal injury claim); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (Naveja Tribal Court had jurisdiction over non-Indian in civil collections
suit).
17. 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988). The United States Supreme Court has granted review on
Duro. 109A S. Ct. 1930 (1989). The questions presented on review are stated as follows:
(1) In light of fact that Indian tribes cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
does Salt River Pima-Maricopa tribe have criminal jurisdiction over petitioner, who is not
member of the tribe? (2) Are equal protection guarantees of Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. 1302, violated if Indian tribes are precluded from exercising criminal jurisdiction
over non-member, non-Indians, but may exert jurisdiction over similarly situated non-
member Indians based solely on race? (3) May petitioner, who is Cahuilla Indian, be sub-
jected to criminal jurisdiction of Salt River Pima-Maricopa tribe because his girlfriend was
tribal member and he temporarily resided on Salt River reservation? (4) Can criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians be predicated, on case-by-case basis, because of sig-
nificant "contacts" between accused and Indian tribe?
57 U.S.L.W. 3744 (U.S. May 9, 1989).
1055Vol. 1989:1053]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
are accused of committing crimes there. In Greywater v. Joshua, 18 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached the
opposite result, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction conflicts with an
Indian tribe's status as a dependent nation.
Despite the inconsistency in these holdings, both courts based their
analysis on the Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe. 19 In Oliphant, the Court held that tribal courts do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 20 In holding so, the Court estab-
lished a three-part test for determining whether a tribe has been deprived
of some aspect of its sovereignty and, hence, its jurisdiction. Indian
tribes, according to the Court, may not exercise powers of a sovereign
state that have been withdrawn by either (1) treaty, or (2) statute, or (3)
that conflict with the tribes' status as dependent nations.21 The depen-
dent status prong of the Oliphant test focuses on whether the exercise of
some aspect of tribal power conflicts with an overriding federal interest.22
This Note analyzes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
and the conflicting opinions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in light of
the three part test set forth in Oliphant. First, in order to give context to
the current disputes, the Note examines the realities of tribal composition
and tribal membership rules.23 Second, the Note argues that the treaties
between the federal government and the tribes do not divest the tribes of
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.24 Third, the discussion
points out that current laws neither expressly assign criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers to the federal or state courts, nor preclude the jurisdic-
tion of the tribal courts; thus, the laws leave open the possibility of tribal
court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 25 Finally, the Note con-
cludes, contrary to the Eight Circuit's holding in Greywater, that the ex-
ercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers does not stand out as
inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status as described in Supreme
Court decisions and current federal policy, nor with the practical realities
of tribal membership and self-governance. 26
18. 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
19. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
20. Id. at 212.
21. Id. at 208.
22. Id. at 209.
23. See infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 147-214 and accompanying text.
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II. TRIBAL COMPOSITION AND MEMBERSHIP RULES
Historically, the focus of U.S. law has been on the Indian tribes
rather than on Indians as individuals. 27 This emphasis on tribal entities,
which continues today, furthers current federal policy aimed at strength-
ening tribal governments and promoting the separate cultural, political,
and economic development of Indians.28
However, the organization of the Indians into various tribes some-
times came as a result of external force, rather than natural familial and
cultural groupings. Prior to the Europeans' arrival in America, changes
in tribal composition occurred when members of one tribe captured
members of another in war, or when members of different tribes inter-
married.29 After the establishment of the United States government,
scattered Indian communities with no formal political organization were
often forced into tribal groupings and a "chief" was appointed by a fed-
eral agent or by Indians themselves, to facilitate treaty-making with the
United States. 30 Similarly, Congress often has created "consolidated" or
"confederated" tribes, sometimes composed of Indians that do not even
speak the same language, to form a single political entity with which the
government can carry on relations.31 Once established, these "tribes"
largely have continued to exist as units.32
Over time, the tribes solidified internal control by establishing mem-
bership rules similar to those existing in natural tribal groups. Although
27. The European colonists who arrived in North America naturally negotiated with tribes
rather than individuals because the tribes treated land as a collective resource and possessed consid-
erable military power. See Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection
of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 986 (1981). The U.S. government
continued the practice by dealing with the Indians collectively in both treaties and statutes. Id. at
987.
28. Id. at 988-89.
29. Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Ind. L. Rptr. 6008, 6009 (Intertr. Ct. App. 1984).
30. Clinton, supra note 27, at 987-88. See, eg., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 664 n.5 (1979) (territorial officials aggregated loose bands into tribes and appointed chiefs when
treaties securing fishing rights were signed); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192
(1978) (related Indian villages bordering Puget Sound were aggregated into a series of tribes prior to
the 1855 treaty); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 1975) (as part of treaty
negotiations, scattered Indian communities were united into a number of tribes with appointed
chiefs).
31. Clinton, supra note 27, at 987-88. Such composite tribes include the Wind River Tribes
(the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indians), the Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes of Oklahoma, the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma (including the Cherokees, Delawares, Shawnees, and others), and the Confed-
erated Salish and Kootenal Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.
32. See, eg., Washington, 520 F.2d at 692 (Muckleshoot Indian tribe, a product of arbitrary
consolidation in 1855, continues as a discrete tribe today).
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tribal constitutions include among their recognized members those Indi-
ans whose names appear on an official census roll,33 the qualifications for
membership vary considerably from tribe to tribe. For example, some
constitutions provide that every child born to any member of the tribe or
community automatically becomes a tribe member, 34 whereas others pro-
vide that interested Indians must apply for membership, 35 or that a child
may not become a member until he reaches the age of majority. 36 Some
tribes have patrilineal membership rules, altogether excluding from
membership children from intertribal marriages who live on the mother's
reservation. 37 Further, some constitutions permit new membership for
Indians who simply become residents of the reservation 38 or desire affilia-
tion with the reservation, 39 whereas others have no such provision.40 Fi-
nally, other constitutions recognize a loss of membership when a member
Indian moves away from the reservation 41 or is found guilty of miscon-
duct on the reservation,42 whereas others have no provision for depriva-
tion of membership status.43
Thus, as a practical matter, the wide array of tribal membership
requirements make it possible for an Indian to reside indefinitely on the
reservation of a tribe without ever becoming a member, even if member-
ship in another tribe has terminated. For example, an Indian of the
Wrangell Cooperative Association in Alaska who moves away from the
reservation and establishes residence with the Prairie Island Indian Com-
munity in Minnesota will lose his membership with the Wrangells, 44 but
33. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY OF MINN. art.
II, § l(a); CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE PRAIRIE ISLAND INDIAN COMMUNITY IN MINN. art. III,
§ l(a); CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE AKIACHAK NATIVE COMMUNITY art. II, § 1.
34. See, e.g., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE OF MICH.,
art. III, § 1(b).
35. See, eg., REVISED CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE art. II, § 1(b).
36. See, e.g., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY art. II § 2;
CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE PETERSBURG INDIAN ASS'N, art. II, § 3.
37. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978).
38. See, eg., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE PETERSBURG INDIAN ASS'N art. II, § l(b); CONST.
AND BYLAWS OF THE AKIACHAK NATIVE COMMUNITY art. II, § 4.
39. See, eg., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE KEWEENAW BAY INDIAN COMMUNITY art. II,
§ 2.
40. See, e.g., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE PRAIRIE ISLAND INDIAN COMMUNITY IN MINN.
art. III.
41. See, eg., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE AKIACHAK NATIVE COMMUNITY art. II, § 3;
CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIVE VILLAGE OF DEERING art. II, § 3; CONST. AND BYLAWS OF
THE AKIAK NATIVE COMMUNITY art. II, § 3.
42, See, e.g., CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE art. II, § 3;
CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE HYDABURG COOPERATIVE ASS'N art. II, § 2(c).
43. See CONST. OF THE SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY OF MINN. art. II.
44. See CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE WRANGELL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION art. II, § 3(a).
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still not qualify for enrollment with the Prairie Island Community.45
Similarly, a full-blooded Indian having parents of different tribal back-
grounds may be ineligible for tribal membership on the reservation where
he resides.46 While nonmember status prevents an Indian from voting or
holding tribal office,47 nonmembers who reside on the reservation or reg-
ularly participate in reservation life are generally accepted by other resi-
dents as an integral part of the tribal community.48
In recent years, federal governmental policies regarding the Indians
have encouraged movement of Indians among tribes. During the height
of the assimilation period, the Vocational Training Program4 9 removed
large groups of Indians from reservations and placed them in urban areas
which became "melting pots" for Indians of different tribal ancestry.50
The establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A.), 51 which set
up an employment preference for Indians in Indian programs, resulted in
the presence of many nonmember Indians on reservations. Likewise, the
Indian Child Welfare Act,52 which gave tribes the authority to transfer
court proceedings involving minors back to tribal courts and established
an order of preference for adoptive53 and pre-adoptive 54 placement of
Indian children, also led to the placement of children from one tribe on
to the reservation of another.55
Such practices and policies have resulted in continually changing
tribal compositions. Thus, today there are two situations of note: tribes
45. See CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE PRAIRIE ISLAND INDIAN COMMUNITY IN MINN. (June
20, 1976).
46. See, eg., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (full-blooded Indian chil-
dren of Santa Clara Pueblo mother and Navajo father ineligible for tribal membership since Santa
Clara Pueblo membership rule was patrilineal).
47. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (1988).
48. Clinton, supra note 27, at 1015-16.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 309 (1982).
50. Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Ind. L. Rptr. 6008, 6009 (Intertr. Ct. App. 1984).
51. Act of July 9, 1832, ch. 174, § 1, 4 Stat. 564, 564.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1982).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982) provides the following:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given,
in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the
child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian
families.
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) provides the following:
In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, to a placement with-
(i) a member of the child's extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing
authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organ-
ization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.
55. Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Ind. L. Rptr. 6008, 6010 (Intertr. Ct. App. 1984).
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currently encompass Indians of not necessarily the same background,
and many nonmembers ineligible for tribal enrollment presently reside
on reservations. 56
III. THE CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME FOR CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
As a result of the dependent status of the Indian tribes, the federal
government has plenary authority to enact legislation that deprives the
tribes of important aspects of their inherent sovereignty.57 Congress has
freely exercised its powers to alter the jurisdiction of tribal courts.5 8 The
most recent changes reflect the federal government's increased concern
with crimes committed by and against Indians in Indian country and the
need to ensure that the courts and laws dealing with these crimes prove
adequate. Presently, criminal jurisdiction within "Indian country" 59 is
divided among federal, state, and tribal courts. 60 Although many stat-
utes touch on the issue of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, the
three most important statutes for the purposes of this Note are the Gen-
eral Crimes Act,61 the Major Crimes Act,62 and Public Law 280.63
The General Crimes Act, passed in its original form in 1817, 64 pro-
vides the federal government with broad jurisdiction over all crimes in-
volving an Indian and a non-Indian that occur in Indian country. The
56. Id.
57. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384
(1896); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559
(1883).
58. See, eg., General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988) (discussed infra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988) (discussed infra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text); Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280 §§ 1-4, 6, 7, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1326 (1982)) (discussed infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text).
59. "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988):
"Indian country" ... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any pat-
ent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subse-
quently acquired territories thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinquished, includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the same.
60. See generally Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Ju-
risdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REv. 503 (1976) (explaining when the federal government, the states,
and the Indian tribes have jurisdiction).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
63. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 1-4, 6, 7, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982), and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1982)).
64. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1, 3 Stat. 383, 383 ("any Indian, or other person or persons
-.. within any town, district, or territory, belonging to any nation or nations, tribe or tribes, of
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1817 Act incorporated prior federal statutes and treaties that had
divested tribes of exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
territories. 65 In its current form, the Act explicitly excepts from federal
jurisdiction any crime committed by one Indian against another, any In-
dian already punished by a tribal court, and any crime for which tribal
jurisdiction is explicitly authorized by treaty.6 6 Although no exception is
built into the language of the Act for crimes between non-Indians which
occur on a reservation, the Supreme Court has held that such crimes fall
under state, rather than federal, jurisdiction.67
The Major Crimes Act further extends federal jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country. The Act's predecessor was enacted
by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's 1883 holding in Exparte
Crow Dog. 68 In Crow Dog, the Court ordered the defendant's release
from prison because it found, based on the existing federal statutes and
the Treaty of 1868 with the Sioux, that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over an Indian who had murdered another Indian within In-
dian country.6 9
Currently, the Act confers federal jurisdiction over fourteen major
crimes involving Indian perpetrators. 70 Although the primary purpose
Indians" are under federal criminal jurisdiction, except crimes "committed by one Indian against
another, within any Indian boundary").
65. See generally Clinton, supra note 60, at 522 n.89 (listing prior statutes and the treaties
which they replaced). The effect of the General Crimes Act is to extend federal enclave law to Indian
country where a crime involves both Indians and non-Indians. A federal enclave is a federally cre-
ated and administered area "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1988), such as a national park, which draws its criminal law from both state defined and federally-
defined crimes as dictated by the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988). The exact wording of the General Crimes Act reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the punish-
ment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian
tribes respectively.
Because an Indian already tried and punished in a tribal court is not subject to federal jurisdiction,
federal jurisdiction over Indians is not exclusive, but concurrent with tribal jurisdiction.
67. New York ex rel. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 497 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240,
247 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). The Court depends on the
insignificance of any Indian interest in crimes between non-Indians on Indian land. The rationale
behind the Court's awarding jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians to states is that no Indian
interest is involved in crimes of this sort. Therefore, the Court sees no need to invoke federal juris-
diction to fulfill the guardianship responsibility of the federal government.
68. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
69. Id. at 567-68.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). The exact wording of the Major Crimes Act reads as follows:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming,
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of the Act is to punish an Indian who commits a major crime against
another Indian as if the crime had been committed in a federal enclave,71
the Act applies whether the victim is an Indian or not. It is not clear
whether jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act rests exclusively in the
federal courts or whether tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction.72
Public Law 280 is the third major federal statute controlling crimi-
nal jurisdiction in Indian country. Public Law 280 was passed in 1953
during the height of the "termination era,"' 73 when Congress focused on
making "the Indians within... the United States subject to the same
a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and
a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a)
of this section that is not defined and punished by federal law in force within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws
of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
The original predecessor to the Major Crimes Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362,
385, conferred federal jurisdiction over only seven major crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, as-
sault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.
71. See supra note 65.
72. Unlike the General Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act does not expressly exclude federal
court jurisdiction where the crime has already been tried by a tribal court. For a case supporting
concurrent jurisdiction, see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Supreme Court let murder convic-
tion by court of the Cherokee Nation stand even though the defendant was convicted in 1892, seven
years after the Major Crimes Act was passed). See also Clinton, supra note 60, at 559 n.295 (point-
ing out that the legislative history of the Major Crimes Act supports concurrent jurisdiction). But
see Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967) (prosecution of Indian for rape of
another Indian within Indian country is case not within tribal court jurisdiction); Glover v. United
States, 219 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D. Mont. 1963) (jurisdiction of criminal offenses by Indians in the
Indian country rests with Indian tribes, except where withdrawn by Congress); Iron Crow v. Ogal-
lala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15, 18 (W.D.S.D. 1955) (since Congress authorized the creation of
tribal courts, the tribal court had jurisdiction to try accused for adultery). It is clear, however, that
the federal jurisdiction conveyed by the Major Crimes Act excludes state jurisdiction. United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (Act of March 31, 1885 implicitly excludes states from
exercising jurisdiction over Indians for matters covered by the Act).
A supplement to the Major Crimes Act was enacted in 1948. 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988). Section
3242 provides that an Indian "shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner as are all
other persons committing such offense." In other words, an Indian tried in federal court is subject to
the same procedures as a non-Indian. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973) ("de-
fendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury
rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him on the greater"). To the extent the
Major Crimes Act governs offenses committed by an Indian against the person or property of a non-
Indian, it overlaps with the General Crimes Act. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on
the question of which statute takes precedence when both may apply, lower courts faced with this
situation have held that the Major Crimes Act controls. United States v. John, 587 F.2d 683, 685
(5th Cir. 1979); Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114, 118 (9th Cir. 1970).
73. The "termination era" extended from the 1940 to the early part of the 1960. During this
period, federal trust responsibilities were terminated for approximately 109 Indian tribes and bands,
and in some cases, tribes were disbanded altogether. In addition, Bureau of Indian Affairs programs
encouraged urbanization of Indians. See generally M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMER-
ICAN INDIAN 83-86 (1983) (summary of termination period policies and programs).
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laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are appli-
cable to other citizens of the United States." 74 The law mandated six
states75 to assume exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed
"by or against Indians" on Indian reservations within their territories.
76
In addition, Public Law 280 provided that any other state could'discre-
tionarily assume Public Law 280 jurisdiction by legislative action.77 Six
additional states have taken that step.78
Fifteen years after enactment, Public Law 280 was significantly
amended by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 79 In accordance with
the new "self-determination" policy, which the federal government began
to pursue in early 1960,80 the revised Public Law 280 required tribal con-
sent prior to any state's assumption of jurisdiction.8 1  Significantly, no
tribe has consented to state jurisdiction since the statute's enactment in
1968. In addition to the twelve states that assumed jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 prior to 1968, about eight states still exercise some de-
gree of criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country pursuant to
other federal legislation. 82
In summary, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians, and
concurrent jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated by Indians if the victim
was a non-Indian and the defendant has not been tried already by a tribal
74. H.. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
75. When originally enacted, Public Law 280 conferred jurisdiction on five states: California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. When Alaska was admitted as a state, it was added
to the list. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 1, 72 Stat. 545, 545.
76. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 1-4, 67 Stat. 588, 588-90 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326
(1982)). California and Nebraska were granted criminal jurisdiction over all reservations within
their boundaries. The Red Lake Reservation was excluded from Minnesota's mandatory jurisdic-
tion, the Warm Springs Reservation was excluded from Oregon's mandatory jurisdiction, and the
Menominee Reservation was excluded from Wisconsin's mandatory jurisdiction.
77. Id. §§ 6, 7.
78. Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Washington all assumed criminal jurisdiction
over all or part of Indian reservations within their states under the discretionary provision of Public
Law 280. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 285.16 (West 1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5101 to -5103 (1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 83-801 to -806 (1966); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.430 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63-36-9 to -21 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 37.12.010 to -.070 (1964).
79. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-03, §§ 301-02, §§ 401-06, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1311-12, 1321-26 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
80. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text. The policy of self-determination remains
the current federal viewpoint.
81. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1982). The requirement for tribal consent was not made retroactive.
States may, if they choose, retrocede the jurisdiction they obtained under Public Law 280. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1323 (1982).
82. The eight states are Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma. For a full explanation of the source and extent of the various states'
jurisdiction, see Clinton, supra note 60, at 577-83.
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court. The federal government also has jurisdiction if the crime allegedly
committed by one Indian against another fits one of the fourteen crimes
specified in the Major Crimes Act. State courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed by a non-Indian against another non-Indian
in Indian country, and jurisdiction over crimes committed by or against
Indians on reservations within their boundaries, provided that jurisdic-
tion has been conferred pursuant to Public Law 280 or other statutes.
Tribal courts in states other than those presently governed by Public Law
280 or similar statutes have exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes commit-
ted by an Indian except those in the Major Crimes Act, and may have
concurrent jurisdiction over those crimes as well.
The current jurisdictional scheme does not specify clearly which
court has jurisdiction over nonmember Indians in the case of non-major
crimes. However, as the Duro court pointed out and as will be explained
further in section IV, the statutory scheme supports the argument that a
tribal court has jurisdiction in these cases.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The leading Supreme Court case in this area, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, involved a non-Indian who had been arrested by tribal au-
thorities for assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest.83 Oliphant
claimed that the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court did not have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and he petitioned the district court for
a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether Indian tribal courts have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court ruled that they do not. 4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court's analysis followed three
steps. First, the Court noted that federal legislation implies that tribal
courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. 5 Second, the Court'
examined the particular treaty involved in the case for evidence that the
tribe had relinquished its jurisdiction over non-Indians. 8 6 Finally, the
Court concluded that tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians would be
inconsistent with the tribes' status as dependent nations because of the
conflicting (and superior) federal interest in protecting its citizens "from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."'87
83. 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
84. Id. at 194-95.
85. Id. at 203-06.
86. Id. at 206-08.
87. Id. at 210.
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The Ninth Circuit in Duro v. Reina 88 and the Eighth Circuit in
Greywater v. Joshua 89 addressed the related issue, whether tribal courts
have jurisdiction over nonmembers, in light of Oliphant's proclamation
that "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those
powers 'inconsistent with their status.' "90 Their conflicting applications
of the Oliphant opinion are addressed in turn.
A. Duro v. Reina.
In Duro v. Reina, 91 the Ninth Circuit held that a nonmember Indian
who had significant contacts with the Salt River Indian Reservation was
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal court for discharging a
firearm against another nonmember.92 The court initially applied the ju-
risdictional analysis set forth in Oliphant, 93 but ultimately determined
that this analysis did not resolve the issue. Evidence both for and against
jurisdiction could be found in the treaties and statutes-the first two
prongs of the Oliphant analysis.94
Moreover, the third prong of the test that focused on the tribe's de-
pendency status was not dispositive. In Oliphant, the Court held that
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians conflicted with the overriding federal
interest in protecting personal liberties of U.S. citizens and, therefore,
conflicted with the tribe's status as a dependent nation.95 The Ninth
Circuit, however, found that this federal interest did not dictate the same
result in Duro as in Oliphant 96 since both tribal members and nonmem-
ber Indians had been made U.S. citizens in 1952,97 and no "overriding
88. 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988).
89. 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
90. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
91. 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988). This opinion superceded the Ninth Circuit's first opinion
reported at 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987). Although both opinions found that the tribe had jurisdic-
tion over the non-member Indian, the revised opinion added an additional ground for the court's
holding based on the federal jurisdictional scheme.
92. Id. at 1145. The court framed the issue before it as "a troubling choice between recognizing
new restrictions on tribal sovereignty on the one hand, and placing an additional jurisdictional liabil-
ity upon Indians not members of the tribe whose jurisdiction is in question." Id. at 1139. The
question of jurisdiction over non-member Indians had not previously arisen in federal court. The
modem day reality of displaced tribes, the heterogenity of present day reservations and the increas-
ing sophistication of tribal courts made it issue. Id.
93. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 21-22 (describing Oliphant's
triparate test).
94. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1141.
95. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
96. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1142.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982).
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federal interest" precluded tribal court jurisdiction over criminal defend-
ants who concurrently are members of the tribe and U.S. citizens. 98
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have further confused this issue. Some
of them assume, in dicta, that Oliphant's reasoning should apply to non-
member Indians as well as non-Indians, 99 whereas others do not. °°
The Duro court explained that "what is more dispositive of this case
is the [evidence found in the] federal criminal statutory scheme and its
treatment of crimes committed by Indians;" the court reasoned that this
treatment established the member/nonmember distinction as unimpor-
tant for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 10 1 The federal scheme subjects
individuals to prosecution under the federal statutes based on their status
as Indians or non-Indians, not based on their membership in the tribe
governing the reservation where the offense occurred. 10 2 Because tribal
jurisdiction over Indians covers everything not granted to the federal
government, the court reasoned that a tribe's jurisdiction also must de-
pend on an Indian's status as an Indian, and not on whether he is a
member of the tribe.'0 3
After having determined that the tribal court had not been divested
of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Ninth Circuit then turned
to an equal protection analysis to ascertain whether subjecting a non-
member to tribal court jurisdiction would deprive him of equal protec-
tion of tribal laws in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 104 The
98. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1142. Although this portion of the Duro opinion is confusing, the court
seemed to reason that if U.S. citizenship is the dispositive factor in determining whether tribes have
been divested of jurisdiction over certain persons, then they would no longer be able to exercise
jurisdiction over member Indians since they too are citizens. Such a conclusion would clearly make
the firmly established concept of self-governance meaningless. Thus, U.S. citizenship cannot be the
dispositive factor.
99. The court cited Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 171-73 (1982) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). Duro, 851 F.2d at 1140.
100. The court cited National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
853-55 (1985) and Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980). Duro, 851 F.2d at
1140.
101. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1142.
102. Id. at 1142-43. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
103. Id (citing Arizona ex reL Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1969)).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Act provides guarantees analogous to those
provided in the Constitution's Bill of Rights to those appearing before a tribal court. For example, it
guarantees the right against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment,
as well as the right to equal protection and due process of law. The Act does differ from federal
constitutional standards in certain respects. For instance, the sixth amendment's guarantee of the
right to counsel includes the assurance that an attorney will be provided if the defendant is not able
to afford one. The Indian Civil Rights Act, on the other hand, provides that although a defendant is
entitled to counsel in every case, it must be at his own expense. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6).
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court found no impermissible racial discrimination 05 and held that
Duro's "significant contacts" with the Tribe-he lived and worked on
the Salt River Indian Reservation-were sufficient to justify the tribal
court's assertion of criminal jurisdiction.10 6 In using the "minimum con-
tacts" test, the court was extending the rationale of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, in which the Supreme Court held that "minimum
contacts" between a nonresident defendant and a state seeking to exercise
long arm jurisdiction over the defendant must satisfy due process fairness
requirements, 10 7 to Indian affairs.
In further support of its conclusion that tribal court jurisdiction
over nonmembers was a rational exercise of the tribe's sovereignty, the
court noted that treating nonmembers as members for jurisdictional pur-
poses "would strengthen tribal authority over the reservation"'1 8 and
would assure that nonmembers do not fall through the jurisdictional void
that often results from inadequate state and federal prosecutions. 0 9
B. Greywater v. Joshua.
Greywater v. Joshua involved two members of the Turtle Mountain
Band of Chippewa Indians who were charged by the Devils Lake Sioux
Tribe under its Tribal Code with possession of alcohol in a motor vehicle,
public intoxication, and disorderly conduct.' 10 When the tribal court re-
fused to dismiss the charges for lack of criminal jurisdiction, the defend-
ants filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in United States district
105. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1144. Since the court concluded that the tribal court's extension of
criminal jurisdiction over Duro was not based on race alone, but rather on the "totality of circum-
stances" as to who qualifies as an Indian, the classification was subject merely to a rationality stan-
dard. Id. at 1144-45. For a discussion of the equal protection issue, see Note, Who is an Indian?:
Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty and Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indi-
ans, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 161, 177-81 (Ninth Circuit's recognition of tribal criminal jurisdiction not
limited to a narrow racial classification but is a rational broadening of the definition of who is an
Indian); Note, Indian Self-Determination, Tribal Sovereignty, and Criminal Jurisdiction: What
About the Nonmember Indian?, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 379, 402-06; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Non-
member Indians on Reservations, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 727, 749-55 (arguing that nonmember Indians
must be treated like non-Indians).
106. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1145.
107. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
108. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1145.
109. Id at 1145-46. The court explained that if the tribal court were denied jurisdiction, only a
state court would be able to try Duro because his status would be as a non-Indian for jurisdictional
purposes. As a practical matter, the court noted, state courts often do not exercise their jurisdiction
in cases of this nature; thus, Duro would fall through the resulting jurisdictional void. However, the
court failed to recognize that the federal government could assume jurisdiction in Duro's case under
the Major Crimes Act, for murder. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text for a discussion
of when a jurisdictional void would exist.
110. 846 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1998).
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court. The district court dismissed the petitions, and an appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed.
The Eighth Circuit held in Greywater that the tribal court did not
have jurisdiction over the nonmember Indians. In considering whether
the tribe's sovereign power over nonmembers had been "divested by nec-
essary implication of the Sioux Tribe's status as a dependent nation,"'1I
the court found that the Supreme Court's analysis in Oliphant compelled
it to conclude that the tribal court could not try nonmember Indians.
The court reasoned that the overriding federal interest recognized in Oli-
phant to protect individual liberties of citizens also applied to nonmem-
ber Indians." 2
In support of its holding, the court relied on language in Supreme
Court cases decided after Oliphant which buttress its assertion that non-
members were included in Oliphant's holding. The first case that the
court discussed at length was United States v. Wheeler. 113 The Greywater
court pointed out that the Supreme Court in Wheeler explicitly referred
to the tribes' power over "members" when discussing the retained sover-
eign powers of Indian tribes.114
Similarly, the court cited Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation in support of its decision. The Court in Col-
ville allowed a state to tax Indians living on the reservation who were not
enrolled in the tribe, on the grounds that the tax would not undermine
tribal self-government since "nonmembers are not constituents of the
governing Tribe."115 Employing reasoning similar to Colville, the Eighth
Circuit held that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the nonmem-
ber petitioners was not necessary to guarantee the tribe's right to self-
government because the petitioners could not vote, hold tribal office, sit
on tribal juries, or significantly share in tribal disbursements.11 6
V. APPLICATION OF OLIPHANT'S THREE-PART TEST OF DIMINISHED
SOVEREIGNTY TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONMEMBER INDIANS
As stated above, Indian tribes retain those aspects of sovereignty
that have not been withdrawn either explicitly by treaty or congressional
111. Id. at 489. Because the court found that Congress has not explicitly terminated the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the Devil Lake Sioux Tribe over nonmember Indians, it limited its anaysis to the
third prong of the Oliphant test. Id.
112. Id. at 493 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978)).
113. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
114. Greywater, 846 F.2d at 491-92.
115. 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980).
116. Greywater, 846 F.2d at 493.
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statute, or implicitly as a result of their dependent status. 117 The follow-
ing discussion addresses each of these areas that alter tribal soverignty as
they apply to the inherent authority of a tribe to exercise criminal juris-
diction over nonmember Indians who have allegedly committed a crime
on the tribe's reservation. 118 As both the Duro court and the Greywater
court concluded, and as illustrated below, the first two inquiries clearly
do not preclude exercise of such jurisdiction. 19 The dependent status
question, however, demands careful attention. Neither the Eighth nor
the Ninth Circuits adequately explored this question as the Oliphant
analysis requires. Therefore, the remainder of this Note concentrates on
this final inquiry.
A. Treaty Analysis.
As recognized by both the Eighth Circuit in Greywater12 0 and the
Ninth Circuit in Duro, 1 21 the treaties executed between the United States
and the Indian tribes do not divest the Indian tribes of their inherent
power to exercise jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.1 22 The treaties,
which were primarily concerned with establishing peaceful, friendly rela-
tions between the Indian tribes and the federal government, simply did
not distinguish the treatment of nonmember Indians from other Indians.
Rather, they established a procedure by which crimes that involved U.S.
citizens and Indians would be punished peacefully in an effort to avoid
private retaliation. 123
A typical treaty from the earliest period of treaty-making with the
Indians provided that if any Indian or person residing among them com-
mitted a crime against a U.S. citizen, the tribe was obliged to "deliver
117. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
118. As pointed out by the Duro court, some level of minimum contact with the reservation is
necessary in order for a tribal court to claim jurisdiction over a nonmember. Duro v. Reina, 851
F.2d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1987). Without such minimal contact, a tribe could not claim that juris-
diction is necessary for adequate self-governance. Furthermore, it would be a weak argument to
propose in that case that tribal interest in jurisdiction is any stronger than the state or federal
interest.
119. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1141; Greywater, 846 F.2d at 489.
120. 846 F.2d at 489 (Congress has not explicitly terminated the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe's au-
thority to prosecute nonmember Indians).
121. 851 F.2d at 1141 ("[The historical evidence is equivocal on the question of whether tribal
court jurisdiction extends to nonmember Indians.").
122. The signing of new treaties ceased in 1871 with the passage of the Indian Appropriations
Act, which included a provision stating that Indian tribes would no longer be recognized as in-
dependent nations with whom the United States could contract by treaty. Act of March 3, 1871, ch.
120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
123. See, eg., Treaty with the Quapaws, Aug. 24, 1818, art. 6, 7 Stat. 176, 177-78 (where "the
friendship ... between the United States and the said tribe or nation, should be interrupted by the
misconduct of individuals," the offender was to be "deliver[ed] up" for punishment).
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him... up to be punished according to the laws of the United States."124
Similarly, if a U.S. citizen committed a crime against an Indian, he was
to be punished "in the same manner as if the [crime] had been committed
.*. against a citizen [of the United States]." 125 These early treaties made
no distinction between Indians of the signatory tribe and Indians of other
tribes.
Later treaties included similar provisions, yet they often referred ex-
plicitly to the tribes of signatory Indians. 126 These later treaties resulted
in federal jurisdiction over crimes that specifically involved member Indi-
ans and U.S. citizens.1 27 However, no treaty stipulated that the federal
government would have jurisdiction over crimes involving nonmember
and member Indians. That issue was simply not addressed.
Several of the later treaties did provide that disputes between the
signatory tribe and some other tribe would be subject to federal jurisdic-
tion.1 28 A typical treaty provision of this sort was involved in Ex parte
Crow Dog. 129 The treaty provision stated:
If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation
upon the person or property of anyone, white, black or Indian, subject
to the authority of the United States and at peace therewith, the Indi-
ans herein named solemnly agree that they will, upon proof made to
their agent and notice by him, deliver up the wrong-doer to the United
States to be tried and punished according to its laws .... 130
It has been argued that such provisions made no sense unless they
meant the federal government was responsible for punishing crimes com-
mitted by an Indian against a member of a different tribe.' 3 ' On the
other hand, the apparent purpose behind these provisions was to avoid
tribal war in the event of an intertribal dispute. For example, the treaty
with the Unpquas and Calapooias stated: "Nor will [the signatory tribe]
make war on any other tribe except in self-defense, but will submit all
124. Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. 10, 7 Stat. 39, 40.
125. Id. art. 10, at 41.
126. See, eg., Treaty with the Quapaws, Aug. 24, 1818, art. 6, 7 Stat. 176, 177 (offenders of the
"said tribe or nation" were to be "deliver[ed] up" for punishment).
127. See Comment, supra note 105, at 737-38. If the treaty did not expressly require that federal
law should apply, these treaty provisions necessarily implied that it should because tribal court sys-
tems at that time were not sophisticated. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197
(1978) (noting that few tribes had formal court systems in the 19th century).
128. See, eg., Treaty with the Umpquas and Calapooias, Nov. 29, 1854, art. 8, 10 Stat. 1125,
1127 (providing that the signatory tribes would not "make war on any other tribe except in self-
defence, but [would] submit all matters of differene ... to the government of the United States").
129. 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (ruling that district court was without jurisdiction because federal leg-
islation, which excluded crimes committed in Indian country by one Indian against another, had not
been repealed).
130. Id. at 563 (quoting Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, art. 1, 15 Stat. 635, 635).
131. See Comment, supra note 105, at 737-41.
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matters of difference between them and other Indians to the government
of the United States ... ."132 Individual crimes between members and
nonmembers were not necessarily the type of dispute these treaties ad-
dressed. Therefore, the tribes arguably retained jurisdiction over non-
members for crimes committed on their reservations. 133
The courts have never addressed the question whether these treaties
awarded the federal government criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. Yet the Attorney General in 1883 issued an opinion, Crimes
Committed Against Indians, 134 rejecting the argument that the govern-
ment had jurisdiction over nonmembers. Furthermore, some treaties ex-
plicitly recognized tribal court jurisdiction over any person (including
nonmembers as well as non-Indians) who committed a crime within the
tribe's territory.1 35
Courts will not divest the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes
based on treaty authority without express intent in treaty language.' 36
Because of the lack of express intent in the treaties to divest the tribes of
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, jurisdiction cannot be de-
nied under the first prong of the Oliphant test.
132. Treaty with the Umpquas and Calapooias, Nov. 29, 1854, art. 8, 10 Stat. 1125, 1127.
133. One commentator has argued that an analysis of the treaties between the U.S. and the
Indian tribes reveals that non-members were treated like non-Indians. Therefore, according to the
Comment, a strong argument can be set forth that nonmembers are not subject to tribal court juris-
diction, since non-Indians are not. Comment, supra note 105, at 735 n.59, 737-41. However, be-
cause the intent behind the treaty provisions providing for federal jurisdiction over intertribal
disputes was most likely to prevent intertribal warfare-no evidence to the contrary exists-the
treaties cannot be read to have divested tribal courts of jurisdiction over nonmember Indians for
crimes committed on the reservations. Moreover, a settled principle of treaty interpretation is that
"[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the
wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
134. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 556 (1883). This opinion was authored by the Solicitor General and later
approved by the Attorney General.
135. See, e.g., Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, June 22, 1855, art. 6, 11 Stat. 611, 612
("Any person duly charged with a criminal offense against the laws of either the Choctaw or the
Chickasaw tribe, and escaping into the jurisdiction of the other, shall be promptly surrendered, upon
the demand of the proper authorities of the tribe, within whose jurisdiction the offense shall be
alleged to have been committed.").
136. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 n.17 (1978). But see Comment,
supra note 105, at 737-42 (asserting that the treaties did divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians).
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B. Statutory Analysis.
Statutes, as discussed in section III, may have the effect of divesting
a tribe of some aspects of sovereignty. 137 However, Congress has not
enacted a statute that expressly removes criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians. Federal Indian law fails to distinquish between mem-
ber and nonmember Indians. The only statute that defines "Indian," the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, specifically characterizes "Indians"
as "all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction ... ," 138 Moreover, all statutes pro-
viding services to Indians extend their protections and benefits to all In-
dians, whether they reside on their own tribes' reservation or on the
reservation of some other tribe.1 39
Similarly, the two statutes that specifically address the allocation of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, the General Crimes Act and the
Major Crimes Act, apply to all Indians, not just to member Indians of
the tribe in question. 140 As explained by the Duro court, the relevant
question for the purposes of determining federal jurisdiction under both
of these statutes is whether the Indian who has committed a crime "is a
member of a tribe that has a special relationship with the federal govern-
ment, not whether the defendant happens to have a relationship with the
tribe governing the reservation where the offense occurred."1 41
Statutory authority also does not implicitly divest tribes of criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers. As explained more fully in section III,
criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country is as follows: (1)
137. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. If there is a conflict between a statute and a treaty, the general
rule is that the one later in time governs. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 271 (1898); The Chero-
kee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871).
138. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1982).
139. See. eg., Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 4 (1982); Indian Self-Determination Act
and Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1982); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 (1982); Indian Financing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); cf 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1989) (regu-
latory scheme establishing courts of Indian Offenses provides that these courts "shall have jurisdic-
tion over all offenses... when committed by any Indian, within the reservation or reservations for
which the court is established").
140. See supra notes 64, 70.
141. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (finding the Major Crimes Act applies as long as the Indian is of some
federally recognized tribe); United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1971) (General
Crimes Act applied to member of the Confederated Salish and Kouterai Tribes who committed
crime on Flathead Reservation); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30-32 (7th Cir. 1938) (Indian's relation-
ship to federal government supported federal jurisdiction); cf. United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16,
19-20 (9th Cir. 1974) (Klamath Indian was not subject to federal jurisdiction under Major Crimes
Act for killing a member of the Warm Springs Reservation because her tribe had been "terminated"
from federal supervision; there was no indication that federal jurisdiction was lacking because she
was not a member of the Warm Springs Tribe); Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 686
(9th Cir. 1969) (federal government gave power to tribe to govern mothers due to its relationship).
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federal courts have jurisdiction over all Indians committing major crimes
on reservations; (2) tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all Indi-
ans (on reservations in states not governed by Public Law 280 or similar
legislation) committing offenses not covered by the Major Crimes Act
against other Indians; and (3) tribal courts and federal courts have con-
current jurisdiction over all Indians committing offenses not covered by
the Major Crimes Act against non-Indians.142
If a tribal court does not have jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
for non-major crimes involving other Indians in Indian country, it is im-
portant to realize that no court will have jurisdiction. The federal courts
do not have jurisdiction over such crimes, for the General Crimes Act
explicitly excepts from jurisdiction Indians committing crimes against
other Indians. 143 Similarly, state courts that do not act under the aus-
pices of Public Law 280 or similar statutes have no jurisdiction over Indi-
ans.144 For a nonmember Indian to be tried in a state court, she would
have to be considered a non-Indian. It seems farfetched to assume that
Congress intended that a nonmember Indian should be divested of his
classification as an "Indian" for the sole purpose of trying his criminal
act in a state court. 145 Further, Congress would not knowingly create a
jurisdictional void. 46 The necessary conclusion is that federal law does
not deprive the Indian tribes of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians.
C. Inconsistency with the Tribe's Dependent Status Analysis.
After the Supreme Court in Oliphant determined that a tribal court
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians based on the relevant
treaty or statutes, the Court turned to a third line of analysis. This third
prong added a new dimension to the traditional inherent sovereignty
analysis previously established by the Court. 147 Prior to Oliphant, tribal
142. See supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 66.
144. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text; cf State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 517
(N.D. 1955) (holding that under state law the state had not consented to jurisdiction over Indians
despite the fact that Congress had passed Act of May 31, 1946, 60 Stat. 229, which granted the state
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the Devils Lake Reservation).
145. A state would have even less interest in a crime committed on a reservation within its
territory than the federal government. Under the current self-determination policy, tribal sover-
eignty is analogous to state sovereignty. Just as one state cannot intrude upon the internal affairs of
another state, a state cannot interfere with tribal self-government. However, the federal govern-
ment's relationship with the Indian tribes is "that of a ward to his guardian," Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), thus putting the federal government in a position to exercise
more control over Indian affairs than a state can exercise.
146. See Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1988).
147. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
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sovereignty was defined according to the criteria set forth in Worchester
v. Georgia. 148 Under Worchester, Indian tribes retained those aspects of
internal sovereignty they possessed prior to conquest, except for those
powers expressly withdrawn by treaty or statute. 149 Relying on two
cases from the Marshall era, the Oliphant Court expanded the traditional
analysis to include a concern for the "inconsistency [of the sovereignty of
tribes] with their dependent status."' 150 In the first of these two cases,
Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Court identified an intrinsic limitation on the
tribes' abilities to dispose of their lands at will.' 5 ' In the second case,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court explained that "any attempt [by
foreign nations] to acquire [Indian lands], or to form a political connex-
ion with [the Indians], would be considered by all as an invasion of our
territory and an act of hostility."' 52
The Oliphant Court interpreted these two decisions to stand for the
proposition that once the Indian tribes came under the dominion of the
United States, "their exercise of separate power [was] constrained so as
not to conflict with the interests of th[e] overriding sovereignty" of the
United States.153 Based on this analysis, the Oliphant Court found that
when the United States' interest to protect its citizens "from unwar-
ranted intrusions on their personal liberty" comes into conflict with the
tribes' competing interest to try non-Indian citizens who have committed
crimes on their reservations, the Indian tribes' inherent sovereignty must
yield.' 54
The question remains whether the United States' interest in protect-
ing its citizens from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty at
the expense of tribal court jurisdiction extends to nonmember Indians as
well as non-Indians. To answer this question, this Note first reviews the
post-Oliphant caselaw of the Supreme Court. It then examines current
congressional and executive policy regarding the status of the Indian
tribes. Finally, finding neither of the former two sources of authority
determinative, this Note examines whether the assertion of tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is indeed inconsistent with the
tribe's dependent status in light of the present-day realities of tribal
membership.
148. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 576 (1832).
149. Id.
150. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
151. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
152. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
153. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
154. Id. at 210.
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1. Post-Oliphant Dicta Regarding the Treatment of Nonmember
Indians. As the Ninth Circuit opinion in Duro demonstrates, the
Supreme Court cases after Oliphant equivocate on the treatment of non-
member Indians for jurisdictional purposes.155 While some cases have
assumed that nonmembers are the same as tribal members, language in
other cases suggests that nonmembers are more like non-Indians. A sur-
vey of these cases indicates that the Court has used the terms "member/
nonmember" and "Indian/non-Indian" imprecisely and has not based its
holdings on such distinctions. This Note therefore concludes that the
Court has yet to extend Oliphant's holding-that tribal courts lack juris-
diction over non-Indians-to cover nonmember Indians.
The Eighth Circuit in Greywater relied on United States v.
Wheeler, 15 6 decided only sixteen days after Oliphant, to support the ex-
tension of Oliphant's holding to apply to nonmember Indians. 157 In
Wheeler, the Supreme Court considered whether the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment 58 barred the federal government from
prosecuting a tribal member under the Major Crimes Act who had been
convicted previously of a lesser-included offense in a tribal court.15 9 Af-
ter concluding that a tribe's power to punish its members was an implicit
part of its retained sovereignty, the Court held that "[s]ince tribal and
federal prosecutions are brought by separate sovereigns, they are not 'for
the same offense,' and the Double Jeopardy Clause thus does not bar one
when the other has occurred." 16° Throughout its discussion, the Court
referred to a tribe's sovereign power over tribal members. For example,
the Court described the powers of self-government as "involv[ing] only
the relations among members of a tribe."1 61 Moreover, when citing the
holding of Oliphant, the Court stated that tribal courts "cannot try non-
members in tribal courts."1 62
The Greywater court reasoned that the Supreme Court's use of the
terms "members" and "nonmembers" in Wheeler was a deliberate clarifi-
cation of its prior holding in Oliphant;163 tribal court jurisdiction over
nonmembers includes Indians as well as non-Indians, and is thus incon-
sistent with a tribe's dependent status. If the Greywater court's conclu-
sion, that Wheeler's language extends Oliphant's holding to nonmember
155. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1988).
156. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
157. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 489-92 (8th Cir. 1988).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
159. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 314.
160. Id. at 329-30.
161. Id at 326.
162. IaM
163. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 489-92 (8th Cir. 1988).
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Indians, is correct, then clearly there would be no need for further dis-
cussion of whether a tribal court has jurisdiction. This Note argues,
however, that the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is flawed for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court is not likely to extend its holding in Oli-
phant to include the additional category of nonmember Indians, who
constitute a significant portion of most reservations, 164 without a more
deliberate and explanatory discussion of its reasons for such an exten-
sion. For instance, in National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, the Court refused to extend the holding of Oli-
phant to include civil jurisdiction over non-Indians without "a careful
examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty
has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and
elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions."' 165 Because neither
the tribal court nor the district court had employed such a careful exami-
nation, the Court remanded the case to the tribal court to analyze
whether it retained civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in light of these
more demanding criteria. 166 Applying Oliphant to criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians thus would seem to require, at a minimum, the
same "careful examination."
The second reason the Greywater court's interpretation of Wheeler
suffers arises from the Court's reasoning in Wheeler. Although the
Court in Wheeler failed to explicitly include nonmember Indians in its
discussion of the tribes' retained powers over their own members,167 and
the Court specifically did say that "nonmembers" may not be tried by a
tribal court, closer analysis shows that little significance should be at-
tached to the Court's use of the category "nonmembers" for purposes of
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians committing crimes on the reserva-
tion. The question before the Court in Wheeler was whether a tribe
member was deprived of due process. Understandably, the Court's de-
tailed discussion of the retained powers of sovereignty, including the
tribes' power to "prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws,"' 68 estab-
lished that a tribal court has inherent power over members of its own
164. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION
REPORT: AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMOS, AND ALEUTS, vol. 2, table 4 (1985) (13% of persons
residing on Indian reservations are not enrolled in the tribe); id. at table 7 (23.1% of Indians one
year and older did not always reside on the reservation, implying that they have resided elsewhere,
perhaps on other reservations and may not have been born members); see also infra notes 175-81 and
accompanying text.
165. 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985).
166. Id. at 856-57.
167. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-26 (1978).
168. Id. at 326.
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tribe. Nothing about the facts in Wheeler indicate that the Court gave
attention to the distinction between members and nonmember Indians
with significant contacts to the reservation. Just as easily, one can con-
clude that by "nonmember" the Court meant "non-Indian," or alterna-
tively nonmember Indian without significant contacts with the
reservation. Evidence of the continuing ambiguity is also found in the
Court's plainly imprecise use of the terms "nonmember" and "non-In-
dian" in subsequent opinions. 169 The separate and clearly distinct issue
of jurisdiction over nonmembers as defined in this Note was never explic-
itly addressed in any of the Court's opinions, nor was it resolved by
implication.
The Greywater court relied on Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation 170 as further evidence that the Court's use
of the term "non-Indian" in Oliphant was intended to include nonmem-
ber Indians. 171 Colville is the only Supreme Court case in which an In-
dian's status as a nonmember was specifically applicable to the Court's
holding. The important issue in the case for the purposes of this Note
was whether the state of Washington possessed the power to apply a sales
and cigarette tax to nonmember Indians. 172 Finding that the state's in-
terest in taxing nonmembers outweighed any tribal interest to prevent
such a tax, the Court held that Washington indeed possessed this taxing
power. The Court based its holding, in part, on the premise that al-
lowing the state to tax nonmembers would not "contravene the principle
of tribal self-government" since the nonmember purchasers "are not con-
stituents of the governing tribe" and do not "have a say in tribal affairs or
significantly share in tribal disbursements."1 73 The Court declared, "for
most practical purposes those Indians stand on the same footing as non-
Indians resident on the reservation." 174
Although the case held that nonmember Indians do not enjoy the
same state-tax immunity as member Indians, the Court's analysis in Col-
ville may support-rather than detract from-the conclusion that tribal
courts have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Criminal ju-
risdiction is one area in which nonmembers do not "stand on the same
footing as non-Indians." A tribe has an undeniably strong interest in
maintaining peace on its reservation. To maintain peace, the tribe's
169. See infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
170. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
171. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1988).
172. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. United States, 447 U.S. 134, 138
(1980).
173. Id. at 161.
174. Id.
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power must extend to all Indians who reside on the reservation or signifi-
cantly participate in reservation activities, whether they are members or
nonmembers. Since criminal jurisdiction is intimately related to effective
self-governance, the tribal courts' interest clearly would seem to out-
weigh any state or federal interest in punishing Indian defendants.1 75
Unlike permitting a state to tax nonmember Indians, divesting tribes of
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who have committed crimes on the
reservations would "contravene the principle of tribal self-government."
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any tribal interest that would carry
greater weight for purposes of self-government and domestic tranquility.
Finally, throughout its discussion of the other issues presented in
Colville, 176 the Court imprecisely and interchangeably used the terms
"non-Indian" and "nonmember." For example, in describing the re-
tained sovereignty of the Indians to tax "non-Indians" on their reserva-
tions, the Court quoted an opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior that described the tribes' taxing power "over nonmembers,
so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence,
etc ..... ,,177 In other words, when specifically confronted with the prob-
lem of treatment of nonmembers, the Court referred to them as "Indians
resident on the reservation but not enrolled in the governing Tribe";1 78
yet when not specifically addressing the status of nonmembers, the Court
used the terms non-Indians and nonmembers interchangeably.
Another case demonstrating the Supreme Court's indiscriminate use
of the terms "non-Indian" and "nonmember" is Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe. 179 The issue in Merrion was whether the tribe had the
power to impose an oil and gas severance tax on non-Indians. In uphold-
ing the tribe's power to tax as a power derived from its powers to exclude
non-Indians from its reservation, the Court explained:
When a tribe grants a non-Indian the right to be on Indian land, the
tribe agrees not to exercise its ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as
long as the non-Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry.
However, ... [a] nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe
remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign
power. The fact that the tribe chooses not to exercise its power to tax
175. By contrast, in Colilile, the Court found "that the State's interest in taxing [nonmembers]
outweighs any tribal interest that may exist in preventing the State from imposing its taxes." Id. at
161.
176. The other issues before the Supreme Court in Colville were: 1) whether the appeal was
properly before the Court; 2) whether Washington's motor vehicle and motor home, camper and
trailer taxes could be imposed on members; and 3) whether Washington lawfully asserted civil and
criminal jurisdiction over the Makahand Lummi Indian Reservations. Id. at 145, 162, 164.
177. Id. at 153.
178. Id. at 160.
179. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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when it initially grants a non-Indian entry onto the reservation does
not permanently divest the tribe of its authority to impose such a
tax.180
Surely, the Court was referring to the same class of persons when it men-
tioned "non-Indian" and "nonmember" in this opinion.
Similarly, in Montana v. United States, 181 the Court discussed the
inherent powers of Indian tribes in the context of its holding that the
Crow Tribe did not have the power to regulate hunting and fishing on
non-Indian lands within boundaries of the reservation. The Court noted:
[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes
retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheri-
tance for members .... But exercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal rela-
tions is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express congressional delegation.' 8 2
Again, the use of the word "members" instead of "those Indians partici-
pating on the reservation," or similar language implying tribal authority
over both nonmember and member Indians, should not be interpreted as
significant in light of the issue before the Court-the Crow Tribe's power
over non-Indian land. Further, while regulatory power over non-Indian
land falls "beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations," criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers re-
siding on the reservation is necessary to control internal relations.
In light of the Supreme Court's imprecise use of the terms non-In-
dian and nonmember, the Greywater court's conclusion that Wheeler and
Colville extend Oliphant to exclude nonmember Indians from tribal court
criminal jurisdiction seems at best tenuous.
2. Current Federal Policy. The current federal policy guiding the
federal government's relationship to the Indians is embodied in the In-
dian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.18 3 The thrust of
the self-determination policy is that because the Indians are a separate
people with a unique cultural background, they should be encouraged to
protect and develop their own customs, system of government, laws, and
judicial system.184 The purpose of the Act is clearly set forth in the stat-
utory language:
180. Id. at 144-45 (emphasis added).
181. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
182. Id. at 564 (citations omitted); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720-21 & n.7 (1983)
(because regulating sales to nonmembers or non-Indians does not interfere with the tribe's self-gov-
ernment, the tribe is subjected to the state regulations unless Congress has pre-empted such action).
183. 25 U.S.C. § 450f-n (1983 & Supp. 1989).
184. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 448 (1977).
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the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has
served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and
their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity to de-
velop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government,
and has denied to the Indian people an effective voice in the planning
and implementation of programs for the benefit of Indians which are
responsive to the true needs of Indian communities .... 185
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act has its
roots in several earlier congressional acts. The Tribal Federal Jurisdic-
tion Act of 1966186 empowered tribes to sue on their own behalf to en-
force their constitutional, treaty, or statutory rights. The American
Indian Religious Freedom Act 187 prohibits federal action from impairing
the Indians' religious freedom, and the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978188 granted tribes and Indian families a greater role in Indian child
placement. In addition, the American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission was established by Congress in 1975 to review federal Indian
policy and to consider "alternative methods to strengthen tribal
government." 189
Like Congress, the executive branch supports Indian self-determina-
tion. As President Reagan stated in his policy statement on Indian af-
fairs: "This administration intends to restore tribal governments to their
rightful place among the governments of this nation and to enable tribal
governments ... to resume control over their affairs."190
Recognition of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
who are living on the reservation or otherwise have significant ties to the
reservation, is entirely compatible with the current congressional and ex-
ecutive policy regarding Indian self-determination. Such jurisdiction
provides tribes with greater control over the affairs of their reservations.
In fact, further restriction of the tribes' sovereignty by limiting their
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers would contravene congressional
and executive policy.
185. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1) (1983).
186. Pub. L. No. 89-635, § 1 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982)).
187. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 & note).
188. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-03 (1982)).
189. § 2(6), Pub. L. No. 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910, 1912 (1975) (not codified but set forth in full at 25
U.S.C. § 174 note).
190. Presidential Statement on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98, 101 (Jan. 24,
1983); see alo President Nixon's Message to the Congress Transmitting Recommendation for In-
dian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970):
It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal government began to recognize
and build upon the capacities and insights of the Indian people. Both as a matter of justice
and as a matter of enlightened social policy, we must begin to act on the basis of what the
Indians themselves have long been telling us. The time has come to break decisively with
the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined
by Indian acts and Indian decisions.
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3. Practical Considerations. Under Oliphant's dependent status
analysis, 191 a court must determine whether a particular exercise of sov-
ereignty by the Indian tribes conflicts with an overriding federal interest.
As pointed out in the preceding sections, neither the Supreme Court's
treatment of nonmember Indians nor federal policy precludes tribes from
maintaining criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers closely associated
with their reservations. This section explores the practical considerations
involved in tribal membership and nonmembership, as they relate to
Indian self-governance, to determine whether recognizing tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who have significant con-
tacts with the reservation is necessary for self-governance. If criminal
jurisdiction is necessary for effective self-governance, then it is difficult to
imagine a federal interest that would override the tribes' significant inter-
est in exercising that jurisdiction.
The court in Greywater noted that the Indian tribes' criminal juris-
diction over nonmembers "is of a completely different character than
their broad power to control internal affairs." 192 The court based its as-
sertion on the principle that a sovereign should govern only those who
have consented to its governance. Since nonmembers do not actively
participate in the government of the tribe, the court concluded that a
tribe's authority over them is "appropriately limited." 193
The fact that nonmember Indians do not have a say in tribal affairs
to the same extent as tribal members 194 does not necessarily justify deny-
ing tribal courts jurisdiction over them in criminal cases. Aliens, who do
not enjoy the duties and privileges of U.S. citizenship, are nevertheless
subject to its laws. 195 Similarly, when a resident of one state commits a
crime in another state, the state where the crime occurred has the power
to try the nonresident defendant and, if necessary, to seek his extradic-
tion from his state of residence.1 96 When an Indian who is not techni-
cally enrolled in a tribe enjoys the benefits of life on a particular
reservation (and even might not have contact with any other reserva-
tion), it is appropriate that the tribal government has some control over
him.
191. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
192. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 1988).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 493; Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1988).
195. See, e.g,, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 422(1) (1986) ("A court in the United States may try a person only for a violation of United States
law, not for violation of the penal law of a foreign state.").
196. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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The Supreme Court has held that the need for internal control does
not automatically invest a tribal court with power over non-Indians.197
The Greywater court found it "anomalous" that nonmembers should be
subject to a tribe's jurisdiction while non-Indians are not, since non-Indi-
ans and nonmembers are both present in significant numbers on Indian
reservations. 198 However, while federal law draws a bright-line distinc-
tion between Indians and non-Indians, it does not distinguish between
member and nonmember Indians. 199
Further, the Greywater court's focus is the opposite of what it ought
to be. The jurisdiction question should not be, as the Eighth Circuit ap-
parently assumes, how far tribal court jurisdiction may extend. Rather,
the proper inquiry is how far may federal courts infringe on the inherent
sovereignty of the tribes in the absence of Congress's express divestment
of tribal sovereignty. When no conflicting federal interest requires the
curtailment of any particular power of an Indian tribe, no justification
exists for doing so.20° Certainly the federal government has an interest in
assuring that a criminal is tried and punished if guilty of a "major" crime
in Indian country, whether the defendant is an Indian or a non-Indian.
When a major crime is not involved, however, Congress has not divested
the tribal courts of jurisdiction over "Indians." This supports the con-
clusion that any federal interest in a crime committed by a nonmember
on a reservation would not outweigh a tribe's interest in self-
governance. 201
In addition to the apparent absence of an overriding federal interest
that precludes criminal court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, the
tribal interest in such jurisdiction outweighs any competing state interest.
The Supreme Court has held that states have no criminal jurisdiction
over Indians unless it is expressly granted by statute. 20 2 The reasoning
behind this denial of state jurisdiction is that the Indian territories are
197. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
198. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486,493 (8th Cir. 1988). Statistics are available showing the
relative percentages of nonmember Indians and non-Indians residing on the reservations. See supra
note 164.
199. See supra notes 101, 138-46 and accompanying text; see also Clinton, Isolated in Their Own
Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 979, 1009-10 (1981) (explaining that federal law draws a line between Indians and non-Indians
in granting Indians a lesser burden of proof in land cases, in giving them employment preferences in
hiring by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and in giving them greater fishing and water rights).
200. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 70 (discussing enactment of the Major Crimes Act).
202. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621,
624 (1881) (dictum). Of course, when Public Law 280 applies, the state will have at least concurrent
jurisdiction. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text. Only if nonmembert were awarded the
status of non-Indians would a state not governed by Public Law 280 or similar legislation have
jurisdiction over them. However, there is little reason to divest an Indian of his ethnological heritage
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sovereign bodies on equal footing with the states and possessing an
equivalent right to self-governance. 203 A state certainly has no more in-
terest in a crime committed on an Indian reservation than the tribe itself
would have, and arguably the state has less of an interest. Rather, it is
essential to a tribe's efficient and effective self-governance that it retain a
large portion of the power to punish those who have violated its laws.
The examination in section I of the modern concept of enrollment in
a tribe as a "member" illustrates how depriving tribal courts of jurisdic-
tion on the basis of tribal membership can be inappropriate and arbi-
trary. Modern tribes are not necessarily composed of Indians whose
descendants shared a common culture and ethnic background. As a
result of tribal conquests and intermarriages, for example, members of
one tribe often became members of another.204 And throughout Ameri-
can history, the federal government has forced scattered, unrelated In-
dian communities into tribes in order to facilitate negotiations between
the government and the tribes. 20 5 Moreover, recent government pro-
grams have stimulated the additional movement of Indians among
tribes. 20 6 As a result of these practices and programs, the modern tribe
often has become a "melting pot" of Indians.
Current tribal provisions for membership may prevent nonmember
Indians who have significant contacts with a reservation and are gener-
ally considered integral parts of reservation life by tribal members from
becoming tribal members. As a result, an Indian may lose his status as a
member of one tribe and still not qualify for enrollment in another.20 7
Thus, a denial of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who ac-
tively participate in the benefits of reservation life is inappropriate since it
creates a class of persons who are without a jurisdictional home.208
Nonmember status deprives an Indian of his right to vote or hold
tribal office. 209 At first glance, it seems fair that one who cannot actively
by classifying him as a non-Indian when there is no advantage to trying him in a state court rather
than in a tribal court.
203. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("Mhe soverign power to punish
trial offenders has never been given up .... ").
204. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
207, See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
208. A counter argument to this analysis can be made. Because a tribe is responsible for estab-
lishing constitutional provisions for membership, the tribe is not in a position to complain that it is
deprived of jurisdiction when the accused is not a tribe member. There is some merit to this con-
trary position, but it seems unreasonable to expect tribes to be able to amend their constitutional
enrollment provisions to provide membership to all Indians who have significant contact with the
reservation over time as the kind of contacts may vary widely, merely to ensure jurisidiction over
these Indians.
209. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 1988).
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participate in a tribal government should not be subject to its criminal
jurisdiction. 210 However, as pointed out above, participation in govern-
ment is not a necessary criteria for asserting jurisdiction over a defendant
in any forum-whether state, federal, or tribal court.211
With no emphasis on the potential for political participation, the
Supreme Court has recognized tribal sovereignty to the greatest extent
possible, unless it has been explicitly withdrawn by treaty or conflicts
with an overriding federal interest.212 In explaining its holding in United
States v. Mazurie that a tribal council had authority to regulate the sale
of alcoholic beverages by non-Indians on the reservation, the Court
stated: "The fact that the Mazuries could not become members of the
tribe, and therefore could not participate in the tribal government, does
not alter our conclusion. '213 Similarly, in Oliphant, the Court's finding
that a tribe's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was in-
consistent with its dependent status was premised upon the overriding
interest of the federal government to protect its citizens' individual free-
doms and not on the fact that these non-Indians did not participate in
tribal government. 214
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether Indian tribes have inherent sovereignty to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who allegedly have committed
crimes on their reservations presents a perplexing issue. Analyzing this
issue in light of the Supreme Court's three part test for divested sover-
eignty set forth in Oliphant is not an easy task. The historical evidence,
as encompassed in treaties and legislation, is ambiguous and provides
little guidance, except for the conclusion that Congress has not yet spe-
cifically addressed the jurisdictional status of nonmember Indians.
Moreover, the final prong of the Oliphant test-whether a particular
aspect of sovereignty is inconsistent with the tribes' status as dependent
nations-is troublesome to apply. Although the language of the test it-
self promises to provide a useful strategy to answer this jurisdictional
question, the Court's brief discussion of what constitutes "inconsistency
with the tribes' dependent status" unfortunately does not offer much
guidance. 215
210. See id.
211. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
212. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978); see supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
213. 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
214. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-12.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
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When confronted with only ambiguous authority on the question
whether tribal courts may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, the Eighth Circuit in Greywater and the Ninth Circuit in Duro
reached opposite conclusions. But both courts inadequately applied the
Oliphant test. The Ninth Circuit, finding that the Court's application of
Oliphant to non-Indians was not dispositive of the question before it,
chose to dismiss the Oliphant analysis altogether. Although recognizing
the third prong of the Oliphant analysis as the key to answering the juris-
dictional question, the Eighth Circuit, in an equally disappointing opin-
ion, relied in its analysis on inconclusive and imprecise language in
Supreme Court cases decided subsequent to Oliphant.
After a more thorough application of the third prong requirement of
Oliphant, this Note concludes that tribal courts should have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers. The current federal policy of self-deter-
mination, which advocates giving the tribes as much authority over their
territories as possible, and the diminishing importance of tribal member-
ship relative to the significance of contacts to a tribe's reservation,
strongly supports acknowledging a tribe's criminal jurisdiction over non-
members.
Chriss Wetherington
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